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A PREFERENCE FOR DEFERENCE: THE BENEFITS OF THE FIRST
CIRCUIT’S CUSTOMIZED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
COLLECTION DUE PROCESS APPEALS IN
DALTON v. COMMISSIONER
ADAM M. COLE*
“It is not our role . . . to determine whether the IRS applied the correct
rule of law. . . .  [W]e need only determine whether the IRS applied a
reasonable view of what the law is or might be.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Typical hardworking Americans pay their taxes on time and in full.2
Some citizens even do so because they view paying taxes as a civic duty.3
Unfortunately, not all people pay the tax they owe, which places a higher
burden on the law-abiding, compliant taxpayers.4  A significant portion of
* Certified Public Accountant; J.D. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University
School of Law; B.S. 2007, Pennsylvania State University.  The author would like to
thank Professor Leslie Book for his guidance in writing this Note.  The author
would also like to thank Megan Pownall, Meghan Talbot, John Uetz, Douglas
Behrens, and Brian Boyle for their helpful comments.  This Note would not have
been possible without the love and support of the author’s wife, Emily.
1. Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 157 (1st Cir. 2012).
2. See 1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2006 AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE RE-
PORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006_arc_vol_1_cover__
section_1.pdf (noting over 95% compliance rate for taxpayers whose income is
reported to IRS on Form W-2 wage withholding or other comparable schedules).
In 2009, approximately 116 million tax returns were filed with reported income
from salaries and wages. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ESTIMATED DATA LINE
COUNTS INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 9 (2009), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-soi/09inlinecount.pdf (showing estimated number of tax returns fill-
ing out selected line items on return).
3. See Kevin Drawbaugh, Taxes Not Just Certain, They’re Right Thing To Do-Survey,
TAX BREAK (Jan. 31, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/taxbreak/2012/01/31/
taxes-not-just-certain-theyre-right-thing-to-do-survey/ (“Most Americans believe
strongly that it’s a civic duty to pay their ‘fair share’ in taxes, that cheating on taxes
is wrong and that cheaters should be held accountable . . . .”); see also INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD: 2011 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 1 (2011),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/reports/2012/IRSOB~Taxpayer%20At-
titude%20Survey%202012.pdf (noting 84% of public feels it is “not at all accept-
able to cheat on one’s income taxes,” while 72% feel it is their civic duty to pay
taxes).
4. See 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (noting each com-
pliant taxpayer was assessed effective subsidy of $2,200 because of costs from
noncompliant taxpayers).  The subsidy amount was calculated by dividing the esti-
mated uncollected tax amount by the number of individual income tax returns
filed. See id. (calling “surtax” on compliant taxpayers “an extraordinary burden to
expect the average taxpayer to bear”).
(239)
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uncollected tax is attributable to businesses failing to pay the payroll taxes
they withheld from employees.5  Every uncollected tax dollar adds to the
already rising federal deficit.6  As a result, politicians have called for some
Americans to pay their “fair share” of income tax to help reduce the defi-
cit.7  Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is under pressure
to collect more tax during periods of budget deficits.8  The current uncol-
lected amount is substantial: at the end of 2010, there was approximately
$359 billion of uncollected tax.9
5. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX COMPLIANCE: BUSINESSES OWE
BILLIONS IN FEDERAL PAYROLL TAXES 7 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/280/278637.pdf (commenting that businesses owed over $58 billion in un-
paid payroll taxes in 2007).  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has the power to
hold business owners personally liable for unpaid payroll taxes. See I.R.C.
§ 6672(a) (2006) (imposing penalty equal to tax amount for willful failure to col-
lect or pay); see also T. Keith Fogg, Leaving Money on the Table and Providing an
Incentive Not to Pay—The Story of a Flawed Collection Device 9–18 (Villanova Univ. Sch.
of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 2008-22), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1226903 (examining
legislative history of section 6672 and arguing statute could better serve as collec-
tion tool if revised to provide liability to responsible company officers).
6. See, e.g., Corey Boles, U.S. Government Records Deficit Higher Than $1 Trillion
for 4th Consecutive Year—CBO, EUROINVESTOR (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.euroinves-
tor.com/news/2012/10/05/us-government-records-deficit-higher-than-1-trillion-
for-4th-consecutive-year-cbo/12106049 (describing record budget deficits and how
higher tax revenues decrease deficit).
7. See, e.g., Editorial, The State of the Union in 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at
A28.  President Obama has called for wealthy Americans to pay their “fair share” in
taxes. See id. (describing President Obama’s state of union address stating that
“any credible plan to wrestle down the deficit must include the wealthy paying a
fairer share of taxes”).  Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney disagrees
with President Obama’s definition of fairness. See Michael D. Shear, Obama vs.
Romney: Battles of Fairness Doctrines, THE CAUCUS (Apr. 27, 2012, 7:26 AM), http://
thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/obama-vs-romney-battle-of-the-fairness-
doctrines/ (describing definition of fairness in various contexts as key campaign
issue).  This Note argues that a fairness distinction should be drawn between com-
pliant and delinquent taxpayers, and delinquent taxpayers who owe the govern-
ment taxes should pay their “fair share.”  For a discussion of the distinction
between these two groups, see infra note 12.  This Note argues that judicial review
of tax collection should be configured to allow the government to collect the “fair
share” of taxes owed from all citizens if it uses reasonable methods.  For a discus-
sion of how a de novo standard of review can create unfairness in tax collection,
see infra notes 153–62 and accompanying text.
8. See 1 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2008 AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS viii (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/
08_tas_arc_intro_toc_msp.pdf (“On the other hand, as the budget deficit grows,
the IRS comes under subtle pressure to collect more federal revenue and close the
tax gap.”); Marilyn E. Phelan, Taxpayers’ Procedural Rights Can Clash With Aggressive
Tax Enforcement, 82 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 149, 149 (2009) (“A concern with the
tremendous and ever-increasing federal budget deficit (estimated to be in the tril-
lions given the enormous projected costs of the recently enacted financial rescue
and economic stimulus plans) may lend continuing support for the Treasury De-
partment’s current more aggressive tax enforcement policy.”).
9. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 42 (2010) (Volume 2), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
2
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Given the importance of tax collection in periods of budget deficits, a
well-functioning tax collection system must be fair and efficient.10  A fair
tax system treats similarly situated taxpayers the same, a concept known as
horizontal equity.11  To treat everyone fairly in the collection context, the
IRS must try to collect from delinquent taxpayers, otherwise law-abiding,
compliant taxpayers would be at a disadvantage.12  An efficient tax system
collects taxes as quickly and inexpensively as possible.13  However, collect-
ing unpaid tax is not cheap: the IRS spent over $5 billion on enforcement
in 2011.14
Because collecting tax revenue is of great importance, Congress his-
torically allowed the IRS to collect taxes with no court interference prior
irs-utl/vol_2_tasresearchandrelatedstudies2010arc.pdf (noting unpaid assessments
increased thirty-three percent from fiscal year 2009 to 2010).
10. See Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection
Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 430 (2008) [hereinafter Cords, Administrative
Law] (“Good tax policy is often said to require efficiency, equity, transparency,
simplicity, and administrability.”).
11. See David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principal of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 43, 43–44 (2006) (explaining concept of horizontal equity and declar-
ing it is “universally accepted as one of the more significant criteria of a ‘good
tax’”).  Accordingly, any “[v]iolation of horizontal equity, while not necessarily fa-
tal, is nevertheless considered a serious flaw in any proposed tax arrangement.” Id.
at 44. See also Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 430 (“A high rate of
voluntary compliance requires, in part, that the tax system be equitable.”); see gener-
ally Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (2008) (explaining
concept of horizontal equity and advocating for its adoption into tax system based
on theoretical and practical justifications).
12. See 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6–7 (explaining that
compliant taxpayers help support shortcomings of delinquent taxpayers and in
part that IRS enforcement against delinquent taxpayers could help collect more
tax).  For the purposes of this Note, a delinquent taxpayer refers to a taxpayer with
a properly assessed tax liability that does not pay the amount owed to the IRS.  A
compliant taxpayer is a taxpayer who pays their tax liability in full and on time.
13. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 430–31 (describing effi-
cient tax collection as being “prompt and cost-effective”).
14. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. FY 2013: BUDGET IN BRIEF 1 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter FY 2013 BUDGET], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/budget-in-
brief-fy2013.pdf (showing prior year budgets by IRS and requested budget for fis-
cal year 2013).  The $5.5 billion investment yielded $55 billion in collection, or
approximately $10 for every $1 spent. See id. at 11 (commenting that IRS enforce-
ment measures are meant to “ensure that taxpayers pay what they owe”).  The
National Taxpayer Advocate has identified the IRS’s inadequate funding as the
“most serious problem facing U.S. taxpayers.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2011) (Volume 1)
[hereinafter 2011 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-utl/irs_tas_arc_2011_vol_1.pdf (arguing one consequence of inadequate
funding is IRS’s inability to “maximize revenue collection, contributing to the fed-
eral budget deficit”); see also Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link
Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1045–48
(2003) (analyzing IRS’s past budgets and arguing agency lacks sufficient resources
to fulfill its compliance responsibilities).
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to collection.15  However, some members of Congress grew concerned
about the IRS’s “nearly unlimited collection discretion.”16  This prompted
Congress to pass the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA”),
which gave taxpayers limited pre-collection rights.17  These rights are re-
ferred to as the Collection Due Process (“CDP”) rights.18
CDP provides taxpayers with the right to a pre-collection administra-
tive hearing to raise challenges to the proposed IRS collection action.19
15. See Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due?  I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330
Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 56 (2004) [hereinafter Cords, How
Much Process Is Due?] (“Historically, due process has not entitled a taxpayer to pre-
deprivation review of IRS decisions to collect assessed, unpaid taxes.”).  Before
1998, a taxpayer generally had no right to protest collection actions until after
collection. See id. at 57 (describing no pre-assessment review as justified “because
of the significant hardship the government would suffer without the ability to
promptly collect taxes owed”).  Judicial review over tax collection was traditionally
limited to post-collection refund claims in either the United States District Court
or the Court of Federal Claims. See id. at 58 (explaining how administrative re-
quest for refund needed to be made and denied before filing refund suit).
16. Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right
Direction?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1156 (2004) (describing desire to “bring IRS
powers more in line with other creditors’”); see also Christine K. Lane, On-The-
Record Review of CDP Determinations: An Examination of Policy Reasons Encouraging
Judges to Stick to the Administrative Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007)
(comparing IRS to “Gestapo” because of its approach to collection activity). But see
Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration As Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm
Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 78–83 (2004)
(describing Senate hearings as “dramatic” and explaining how Senate Finance
Committee spent year gathering collection horror stories to spur change in collec-
tion powers); Bryan T. Camp, “The Evil That Men Do Lives After Them . . .”, 104 TAX
NOTES 439, 442 (2004) (describing perceived abuse as “fundamental misunder-
standing of tax administration”).
17. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105–206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at scattered sections of I.R.C.).
18. Hereinafter referred to as “CDP,” “CDP rights,” or “CDP regime.” See
I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2006) (providing rights for notice of federal tax lien and
rights for notice of intent to levy).  Some commentators have criticized the CDP
regime for unnecessarily slowing collection. See Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of CDP,
Part 2: Why It Adds No Value, 104 TAX NOTES 1567, 1569–70 (2004) (describing
collection process as deciding whether delinquent taxpayer is classified as “can’t
pay” or “won’t pay” and arguing CDP does not generate any new information to
help with that decision); see also Book, supra note 16, at 1188–89 (arguing CDP is
too broad because it allows taxpayers too many opportunities to challenge underly-
ing tax liability); Cords, How Much Process Is Due?, supra note 15, at 99–100 (arguing
CDP hearing procedures should be revised to create uniformity).  This Note does
not take a position on the merits of the CDP regime, but rather argues that the
standard of review for subsidiary determinations should be for reasonableness in
order for the current CDP regime to work as well as possible.  For an argument as
to how a deferential standard of review benefits the tax system, see infra notes
127–76 and accompanying text.
19. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2) (allowing taxpayer to raise spousal defenses, raise
challenges to collection action, and propose collection alternatives).  The taxpayer
can also challenge the underlying tax liability if the taxpayer did not have a previ-
ous opportunity to do so. See id. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (providing opportunity for chal-
lenge if taxpayer did not receive “statutory notice of deficiency for such tax
liability”).
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Taxpayers can also make an offer-in-compromise to settle the tax debt.20
These CDP rights also include the ability to appeal unfavorable collection
decisions to the Tax Court.21  Since 2003, appeals from collection due
process hearings are one of the most commonly litigated issues in Tax
Court.22
In Dalton v. Commissioner,23 the First Circuit dealt with an issue of first
impression: whether subsidiary determinations made during a CDP hear-
ing—such as legal ownership of an asset—should be reviewed de novo or
under a more deferential standard of review.24  In a typical case, an appel-
late court reviews all questions of law de novo, giving no deference to legal
conclusions made by lower courts.25 Dalton held the opposite to be true,
stating that in CDP appeals, all subsidiary determinations are reviewed for
reasonableness, not correctness.26
This Note analyzes how the Dalton standard of review departs from
the Tax Court’s previous de novo approach, and argues that the deferen-
tial review benefits the tax system because it treats taxpayers fairly and al-
lows the IRS proper deference to collect taxes in an efficient manner.27
Part II provides a brief background of the CDP process, with an emphasis
on the offers-in-compromise issue discussed in Dalton.28  Part II also de-
scribes the standard of review that past courts have used in CDP appeals,
20. For a further discussion of the offer-in-compromise procedure, see infra
notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
21. See § 6330(d)(1) (providing Tax Court with jurisdiction for appeals within
thirty days of determination).
22. See 2011 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 619 (analyzing sig-
nificant CDP cases decided during year).
23. 682 F.3d 149 (1st Cir. 2012).
24. See id. at 151–52 (acknowledging that “no court has had the occasion to
parse that standard and analyze how it plays out with respect to subsidiary factual
and legal determinations made by the IRS during the CDP process”); see also Tax
Court Collection Due Process Standard of Review Upended by the First Circuit, TAX TRIALS
(June 25, 2012), http://taxtrials.com/?p=1346 (suggesting Dalton decision “could
dramatically change collection due process”).  This Note refers to the subsidiary
factual and legal determinations that are made before the final CDP determina-
tion simply as “subsidiary determinations.”  For a further explanation of subsidiary
determinations in the CDP context, see infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
25. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (describing typical
standards of review); 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 646 (2013) (“An appellate
court freely reviews a trial court’s decision concerning an issue of law and no defer-
ence is owed to the views of the trial court in this context.”).
26. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 156 (“In sum, a court’s job is not to review the IRS’s
CDP determinations afresh.  Rather, its job is twofold: to decide whether the IRS’s
subsidiary factual and legal determinations are reasonable and whether the ulti-
mate outcome of the CDP proceeding constitutes an abuse of the IRS’s wide
discretion.”).
27. For a discussion of how Dalton departs from the Tax Court’s previous ap-
proach, see infra notes 110–26 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the
reasons why the Dalton standard benefits the tax system, see infra notes 127–76 and
accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the CDP process and relevant statutory background,
see infra notes 36–49 and accompanying text.
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as well as how the standard has been applied to subsidiary legal determina-
tions.29  Part III describes the factual and procedural background of the
Dalton case and analyzes the First Circuit’s reasoning.30  Part IV argues that
the First Circuit reached the correct result because the Dalton standard of
review increases efficiency and fairness, and is consistent with the purpose
of CDP.31  Part V concludes by urging Congress to expressly incorporate
this standard into the CDP statutes because of the likelihood that the Tax
Court will not apply the standard in cases appealable to the other
circuits.32
II. A PECULIAR PROCESS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CDP AND ITS
TRADITIONAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW
CDP gives taxpayers the right to an administrative hearing to dispute
a proposed collection action.33  An important part of the regime is the
ability to appeal unfavorable administrative decisions to the Tax Court,
which generally uses an abuse of discretion standard of review.34  The Tax
Court has also used a de novo review of certain subsidiary determinations
that are made before the final CDP determination.35
A. CDP: What Are Your “Rights” Before Collection?
The IRS can assess a tax liability in one of two ways: (1) through an
underpayment, when a taxpayer files a tax return showing a balance due
and does not pay; and (2) through the deficiency process, when the IRS
claims that the taxpayer should have paid more tax than was paid on the
finalized return.36  Once the IRS properly assesses a tax liability, it can
29. For a discussion of the standard of review the Tax Court uses in CDP cases
and how it has been applied in certain circumstances, see infra notes 50–62 and
accompanying text.  For a discussion of the standard of review the Tax Court used
to review subsidiary determinations in prior CDP cases, see infra notes 63–75 and
accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of Dalton and an analysis of the First Circuit’s decision,
see infra notes 76–106 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion how the Dalton standard increases efficiency in the tax
system, see infra notes 131–52 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of how it
increases fairness in the tax system, see infra notes 153–62 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of how the standard adheres to CDP’s purpose, see infra notes
163–76 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of why Congress should codify the Dalton standard of
review, see infra notes 177–82 and accompanying text.
33. For a general overview of the CDP process, see infra notes 36–49 and ac-
companying text.
34. For a discussion of judicial review of CDP decisions, see infra notes 50–62
and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of the standard of review the Tax Court used in past cases
involving subsidiary determinations, see infra notes 63–75 and accompanying text.
36. See Book, supra note 16, at 1150 (explaining how IRS properly assesses tax
liabilities).  If a taxpayer does not pay after a valid assessment, an automatic lien in
favor of the IRS arises on all of a taxpayer’s property. See id. (explaining lien is in
amount of tax liability and includes potential interest and penalties).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss2/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR202.txt unknown Seq: 7  3-APR-13 11:06
2013] NOTE 245
exercise its “powerful administrative collection powers.”37  The IRS has
two main collection powers affected by CDP: tax liens and tax levies.38
After an assessment of liability and demand for payment, the IRS can levy
a taxpayer’s property to satisfy the debt if the tax remains unpaid.39
Under CDP, after the IRS files a Notice of Intent to Levy or a Notice
of Federal Tax Lien, it must inform a taxpayer of their right to request a
CDP hearing with the IRS Office of Appeals.40  At the hearing, the tax-
payer can propose collection alternatives.41  One common collection alter-
37. Id. at 150–52 (providing background on tax liens and levies); see also
Cords, How Much Process Is Due?, supra note 15, at 54 (describing assessment as
“first step” in collection process).
38. See I.R.C. § 6331(b) (2006) (“The term ‘levy’ as used in this title includes
the power of distraint and seizure by any means.”); see also Bryan T. Camp, Failure
of Collection Due Process, Pt. 1: The Collection Context, 104 TAX NOTES 969, 970 (2004)
[hereinafter Camp, Collection Context] (providing explanation of all three collec-
tion powers but noting ability to offset liabilities with refunds not relevant to CDP
because RRA did not address it).  Tax liens arise automatically after the IRS as-
sesses a tax liability. See I.R.C. § 6321 (providing lien arises “upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person”); see also
Camp, Collection Context, supra, at 970 (describing lien as “virtual sticky note[ ]
claiming ‘Pay Me’ on all property the taxpayer has or acquires”).  The lien is mis-
understood because the IRS does not file for a lien like a typical creditor would,
but instead files the notice of the lien. See id. (explaining lien already exists be-
cause of automatic trigger from Code).  The IRS must file a Notice of Federal Tax
Lien to give notice of the lien to third parties. See id. (explaining that lien is effec-
tive tool for real property because lien is paid off when property is sold).  Although
only one lien exists, the IRS can file multiple notices of the lien depending on
where the taxpayer has assets. See id. (noting IRS can enforce lien through “either
inquisitorial process (levy) or adversarial process (court action)” if lien is not paid
off when property sold).
39. See I.R.C. § 6331(a) (delegating authority to Secretary of Treasury to col-
lect tax through levy power).  The IRS must give thirty days notice before levying
property. See id. § 6331(d)(2) (providing notice must be in person, left at dwelling
or usual place of business, or sent by certified mail); see also Camp, Collection Con-
text, supra note 38, at 971 (describing levy as another misunderstood tool and as
statutory power to take property to settle tax debt).  The levy must be asserted
against a specific piece of property, unlike a lien that “attaches to all future ac-
quired property as well as current property.” Id. (noting liens and levies can be
used together even though they are separate collection tools).
40. See I.R.C. §§ 6320(a)(1), 6330(a)(1) (providing for tax liens and tax le-
vies).  The hearing must be conducted by an IRS agent with no previous connec-
tion to the taxpayer’s case. See id. § 6330(b)(3) (allowing taxpayer to waive
impartial officer requirement).  The hearing is informal in nature. See Cords, How
Much Process Is Due?, supra note 15, at 65–70 (describing various ways hearings are
conducted, including telephone, face-to-face, correspondence only, or combina-
tion of all three).  Taxpayers must submit a request for a hearing in writing, and
are encouraged to use Form 12153 “Request for a Collection Due Process Hear-
ing.” See Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2006) (describing alterna-
tive steps to properly request CDP hearing and detailing written requirement
important for evidentiary purposes to ensure timely request).
41. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii) (allowing taxpayer to raise “offers of collec-
tion alternatives, which may include the posting of a bond, the substitution of
other assets, an installment agreement, or an offer-in-compromise”).  Although the
Code lists these issues that can be raised, it is not a fully inclusive list. See Cords,
7
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native is the offer-in-compromise (“OIC”), a procedure in which a
taxpayer offers to settle a tax liability for less than the full amount.42
Before deciding whether to accept or reject an OIC, the IRS first cal-
culates a taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential (“RCP”), or what it ex-
pects the taxpayer could reasonably pay in tax.43  The IRS calculates the
RCP by analyzing the taxpayer’s expected income, estimated living ex-
penses, assets, and liabilities.44  The IRS’s initial conclusions on the tax-
How Much Process Is Due?, supra note 15, at 89 (explaining legislative history of RRA
shows list was not meant to be limited).  Taxpayers are generally excluded from
raising any issue that was “raised in a prior proceeding in which the taxpayer
meaningfully participated . . . .” Id.
42. See I.R.C. § 7122(a) (2006) (authorizing Secretary of Treasury to “compro-
mise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws prior to
reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense”).  A taxpayer
must submit Form 656: Offer in Compromise, describing the taxpayer’s circum-
stances and why the IRS should accept, along with at least a 20% payment of the
offer amount. See Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming
Tax Law’s Offer-In-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1077–81 (2012)
(describing OIC procedure in detail); see also MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK,
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶¶ 15.07[3][a]-[b] (2010) (listing advantages and
disadvantages to taxpayer of making offer-in-compromise); see generally I. Jay Katz,
An Offer in Compromise You Can’t Confuse: It Is Not the Opening Bid of a Delinquent
Taxpayer to Play Let’s Make a Tax Deal with the Internal Revenue Service, 81 MISS. L.J.
1673, 1681 (2012) (offering detailed history of development of OIC process and
analyzing major developments in law).  The regulations provide three reasons why
the IRS would exercise its discretion and accept an OIC: (1) doubt as to liability;
(2) doubt as to collectability; and (3) the promotion of effective tax administra-
tion. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(iii) (2002) (prohibiting compromise if it
would “undermine compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws”); see also Oei, supra,
at 1078–80 (describing all three grounds for compromise and circumstances in
which IRS would accept OIC under each).  The OIC procedure has several policy
goals:
• Effect collection of what can reasonably be collected at the earliest
possible time and at the least cost to the government.
• Achieve a resolution that is in the best interests of both the individual
taxpayer and the government.
• Provide the taxpayer a fresh start toward future voluntary compliance
with all filing and payment requirements.
• Secure collection of revenue that may not be collected through any
other means.
Oei, supra, at 1078.  The IRS most often accepts an OIC because of doubt as to
collectability. See id. (detailing IRS’s procedure for determining taxpayer’s ability
to pay).
43. See Oei, supra note 42, at 1078 (commenting that IRS must calculate RCP
to “determine the taxpayer’s ability to pay”).  The Internal Revenue Manual, a
non-binding guide for IRS employees, defines RCP as “the amount that can be
collected from all available means, including administrative and judicial collection
remedies.”  IRM 5.8.4.3(2) (June 1, 2010).
44. See Oei, supra note 42, at 1079 (“Essentially, in determining whether a
doubt-as-to-collectability offer should be accepted, the IRS has to analyze the tax-
payer’s assets, expenses, and liabilities.”).  The RCP calculation accounts for the
“taxpayer’s expected future income after taking into account necessary living ex-
penses.” Id. (commenting that IRS uses national and local standards for calculat-
ing living expenses).  The RCP calculation considers the “net realizable equity” in
assets. See id. at 1079 n.24 (noting net realizable equity is calculated using “quick
8
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payer’s financial circumstances—such as whether the taxpayer owns
certain assets—can be referred to as subsidiary determinations.45  They
are subsidiary determinations because the IRS must make these decisions
before making the final determination of whether to accept the OIC.46
Although the IRS has complete discretion to accept or reject an OIC,
the IRS will almost always reject an OIC if it calculates a RCP that is higher
than the taxpayer’s offer.47  The Appeals Officer issues a final written de-
termination as to whether the collection action can proceed after the of-
ficer reviews the proposed action and any proposed collection
alternatives.48  The taxpayer then has thirty days to appeal an unfavorable
CDP determination to the Tax Court.49
sale value,” or value if taxpayer had to sell within ninety days).  The calculation also
includes a taxpayer’s “income or assets that are available to the taxpayer but be-
yond the reach of the IRS, such as property held abroad.” Id. at 1079.
45. See Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 152 (1st Cir. 2012) (describing IRS’s
conclusions as to taxpayer’s legal ownership of certain assets before deciding
whether to accept OIC as subsidiary determinations).  Although these issues could
be referred to as underlying legal or factual issues, for the purposes of this Note
they will be called subsidiary determinations to be consistent with the First Cir-
cuit’s language in Dalton. See id. (describing IRS’s decision on underlying owner-
ship issue as “subsidiary determination”).  Whether a taxpayer wrongly dissipated
an asset prior to making an OIC is another example of a subsidiary determination.
See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307, 1315 (2011) (affirming IRS’s
decision to include value of taxpayer’s stock trading losses in RCP because it deter-
mined taxpayer disregarded tax liability and could have used money to pay out-
standing taxes), aff’d, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  If the IRS determines the
taxpayer wrongly dissipated an asset without regard to an outstanding tax liability,
it will include the asset’s value in the RCP. See id. at 1314 (noting that although
inclusion of dissipated assets does not increase actual collection potential, inclu-
sion rule deters “delinquent taxpayers from wasting money that they owe and
should pay as taxes”).  Therefore, an asset dissipation issue is a subsidiary determi-
nation because the IRS must first determine whether the dissipated asset should be
included in the RCP before deciding whether to accept or reject the OIC. See IRM
5.8.5.16 (Oct. 16, 2010) (giving instructions to IRS employees to consider asset
dissipation prior to ruling on OIC).  Another example of a subsidiary determina-
tion is when the IRS determines whether a taxpayer’s liabilities were discharged in
bankruptcy before ruling on a proposed collection action.  For a discussion of the
Tax Court’s standard of review of subsidiary determinations for bankruptcy issues,
see infra notes 63–75 and accompanying text.
46. See Oei, supra note 42, at 1078 (explaining OIC requires IRS to first deter-
mine taxpayer’s RCP to facilitate comparison with offer amount).
47. See IRM 5.8.4.3(2) (June 1, 2010) (“[T]he decision to accept or reject
usually rests on whether the amount offered reflects the reasonable collection po-
tential (RCP).”); Oei, supra note 42, at 1074 (“The taxpayer must meet certain
requirements and conditions in order to qualify, and the IRS has the discretion to
accept or deny the offer.”).
48. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3) (2006) (requiring officer to consider valid issues
raised by taxpayer before making final determination).  The Appeals Officer must
also consider whether the “proposed collection action balances the need for the
efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that any
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.” Id. § 6330(c)(3)(C).
49. See id. § 6330(d)(1) (giving Tax Court exclusive jurisdiction for appeals).
The Tax Court is an Article I court of record that only has jurisdiction over cases
9
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B. Judicial Review of CDP Appeals
The Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) does not set the standard of
review for collection due process appeals.50  Instead, the Tax Court looks
to the legislative history of the RRA for guidance on the proper stan-
dard.51  The Tax Court uses an abuse of discretion review when the under-
lying tax liability is not in dispute.52  Under the abuse of discretion
standard, the Tax Court will only reverse the IRS’s final determination if it
finds the decision “arbitrar[y], capricious[ ], or without sound basis in fact
or law.”53  Circuit courts that have considered the issue have all ruled that
abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review.54
While the final IRS decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, in
Robinette v. Commissioner55 the Tax Court held that it could consider new
evidence that was not part of the administrative record to determine
whether the IRS abused its discretion.56  Consideration of new evidence
Congress specifically assigns to it by statute. See SALTZMAN, supra note 42, at 1.06[1]
(explaining history of Tax Court and noting that it “adjudicates cases in the same
manner as a federal district court judge sitting without a jury”).  The Tax Court is a
single court located in Washington D.C. that travels around the country in desig-
nated cities to conduct trials. See About the Court, U.S. TAX COURT (last updated
May 25, 2011), http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about.htm (giving general background
of Tax Court).  It is comprised of nineteen judges that are appointed by the Presi-
dent. See id. (explaining appointed judges are experts in tax law).
50. See I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (presenting provisions for CDP, but not judicial
review).
51. See, e.g., Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 609–10 (2000) (noting standard of
review not provided in Code, but guidance found in legislative history).
52. See id. at 610 (“Where the validity of the tax liability is not properly part of
the appeal, the taxpayer may challenge the determination of the appeals officer
for abuse of discretion.”).
53. Woodral v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).
54. See Schwartz v. Comm’r, 348 F. App’x 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting
parties did not dispute that rejection of OIC was reviewed for abuse of discretion);
Salazar v. Comm’r, 338 F. App’x 75, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding IRS did not
abuse discretion in rejecting OIC); Keller v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 710, 716 (9th Cir.
2009) (“Like the Tax Court, our review of the decision by the Commissioner
whether to accept an offer-in-compromise is for an abuse of discretion.”);
Poindexter v. Comm’r, 321 F. App’x 771, 773 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying abuse of
discretion review to IRS administrative determinations); Marshall v. United States,
300 F. App’x 636, 638 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying abuse of discretion review to IRS
decision that taxpayer’s ability to pay exceeded OIC); Murphy v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d
27, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding abuse of discretion review of administrative deter-
mination appropriate in collection due process appeal when underlying tax liabil-
ity not in dispute); Orum v. Comm’r, 412 F.3d 819, 820 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
Jones and noting “[j]udicial review of [IRS determinations] is deferential”); Living
Care Alts. of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2005)
(looking to legislative history for guidance on applying abuse of discretion review
when tax liability is not in dispute); Jones v. Comm’r, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir.
2003) (stating courts review IRS administrative determinations for abuse of
discretion).
55. 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006).
56. See id. at 95–96 (holding Administrative Procedure Act not applicable and
therefore court could consider new evidence in abuse of discretion review).
10
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under an abuse of discretion standard of review is referred to as a de novo
scope of review.57  The Tax Court stated that it reviewed the IRS’s final
decision for abuse of discretion, but effectively held a trial de novo by
considering new evidence.58  The de novo scope of review allowed the Tax
Court to substitute its judgment for that of the IRS because the court con-
sidered evidence that the IRS did not, creating a standard of review that
was similar to de novo.59  Under the rule of Golsen v. Commissioner,60 the
Tax Court follows the law of the circuit court to which an appeal would
follow.61  Therefore, although the Eight Circuit expressly overturned the
Robinette decision, the Tax Court continues to follow Robinette in cases ap-
pealable to circuits that have not yet ruled on the issue.62
C. The Decision Before the Decision: Standard of Review for Subsidiary
Determinations in Past Tax Court Cases
Whereas the final CDP determination is reviewed using an abuse of
discretion standard of review, the IRS must first make several subsidiary
57. See Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 122–23 (2008) (discussing intersec-
tion and differences of scope of review and standard of review).  The standard of
review refers to the level of deference an appellate court will give to a lower court’s
findings; the scope of review refers to whether the court will consider new evi-
dence or not. See id. (explaining standard of review and scope of review).  If a
reviewing court considers new evidence, it is referred to as a de novo scope of
review. See id. (referring to admission of new evidence as holding “de novo trial”).
58. See Med. Practice Solutions, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1392,
1395 (2010) (describing Robinette as providing for “de novo trial”).  Nevertheless,
the Robinette court purported to review the IRS decision for abuse of discretion. See
Robinette, 123 T.C. at 105 (“Where, as here, the validity of the underlying tax liabil-
ity is not at issue, we review the determination for abuse of discretion.”).
59. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 445 (describing Tax
Court’s standard of review as “more closely resembl[ing] de novo review” and ar-
guing Tax Court applies de novo standard “because of its limited experience with
abuse of discretion review”); see also Book, supra note 16, at 1173–74 (describing
Tax Court’s approach as “taxpayer friendly” because it holds “trials de novo in
situations where an abuse of discretion standard applies”).
60. 54 T.C. 742 (1970).
61. See id. at 757 (“[W]e think that where the Court of Appeals to which ap-
peal lies has already passed upon the issue before us, efficient and harmonious
judicial administration calls for us to follow the decision of that court.”), aff’d, 445
F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).  For individuals, the proper venue for appeal is deter-
mined by the circuit in which the taxpayer resides. See I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A)
(2006) (providing residence determined at time petition filed). But see James Bam-
berg, A Different Point of Venue: The Plainer Meaning of Section 7482(b)(1), 61 TAX
LAW. 445, 457–60 (2008) (arguing D.C. Circuit is proper venue for CDP appeals
according to plain meaning of statute).
62. See, e.g., Med. Practice Solutions, L.L.C., 99 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1395 (declining
to follow Robinette solely because of Golsen in light of realization that appeal would
be to First Circuit).  No circuit has followed the Tax Court’s approach in Robinette
to allow new evidence that was not part of the administrative record. See Keller v.
Comm’r, 568 F.3d 710, 718 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur review is confined to the re-
cord at the time the Commissioner’s decision was rendered.”); Murphy v. Comm’r,
469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006) (following administrative record rule to disallow
new evidence during appeal in Tax Court).
11
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factual and legal determinations before making the final CDP determina-
tion and the issue of which standard of review applies to these determina-
tions has arisen in past Tax Court decisions.63  In Swanson v.
Commissioner,64 the Tax Court held that if the IRS committed an error of
law, it was an automatic abuse of discretion.65  The court, analyzing a sub-
sidiary bankruptcy law issue, never stated under which standard of review
it would analyze the subsidiary determination of law.66  Nevertheless, the
standard of review resembled de novo because the Tax Court performed
its own analysis of the law and substituted its own view without any men-
tion of the IRS’s interpretation.67
The Tax Court addressed the issue again in Kendricks v. Commis-
sioner,68 stating that the outcome regarding the subsidiary determination
of law was the same—whether reviewed de novo or for abuse of discre-
tion—because erroneous views of the law cannot stand under either stan-
dard.69  The Tax Court relied on its previous decision in Swanson and the
63. For a discussion of the subsidiary decisions that the IRS must make before
deciding whether to accept or reject an OIC, see supra notes 45–46 and accompa-
nying text.  For a discussion of cases addressing the issue of the standard of review
for subsidiary determinations, see infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text.
64. 121 T.C. 111 (2003).
65. See id. at 119 (“If [the IRS]’s determination was based on erroneous views
of the law . . . then we must reject [the IRS]’s views and find that there was an
abuse of discretion.”); see also Freije v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 14, 36 (2005) (holding
that IRS error of law was “accordingly an abuse of discretion”).
66. See Swanson, 121 T.C. at 119 (declaring that it would be abuse of discre-
tion if IRS determination was erroneous view of law, but not stating how appellate
court would review that determination).  In Swanson, the taxpayer argued that the
collection action should not proceed because the taxpayer’s liabilities were dis-
charged in a bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 120–25 (analyzing whether tax-
payer’s tax liability was “dischargable debt” under bankruptcy law).  Under
bankruptcy law, all of a debtor’s debts are generally discharged. See id. at 120
(describing general rule for debts incurred prior to filing).  Although the bank-
ruptcy court’s order discharged the debtor from all “dischargable debts,” the order
did not address whether the debtor’s tax liabilities were discharged. See id. at 121
(commenting that record was unclear whether specific tax liabilities were included
in bankruptcy court discharge order).
67. See id. at 125 (“Accordingly, we hold that pursuant to [the Bankruptcy
Code], the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas did not dis-
charge petitioner from his unpaid liabilities . . . .”).  The court did not discuss the
IRS’s determination, but merely declared its own judgment—a review similar to de
novo. See id. at 120–25 (analyzing bankruptcy law issue without reference to IRS’s
conclusions).
68. 124 T.C. 69 (2005).
69. See id. at 75 (“When faced with questions of law . . . the standard of review
makes no difference.  Whether characterized as a review for abuse of discretion or
as a consideration ‘de novo’ (of a question of law), we must reject erroneous views
of the law.”).  In Kendricks, the question of law turned on whether the taxpayer had
an opportunity to contest the tax liability at the taxpayer’s bankruptcy proceeding.
See id. at 73 (describing taxpayer’s request for CDP hearing to dispute underlying
tax liability).  The court analyzed the Bankruptcy Code, the Tax Code, and case
law to hold that the taxpayer did have the opportunity to dispute the liability in
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss2/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR202.txt unknown Seq: 13  3-APR-13 11:06
2013] NOTE 251
Supreme Court’s decision in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.70 for the prin-
ciple that errors of law cannot stand under an abuse of discretion review.71
The Hartmarx Court noted that an abuse of discretion would always occur
if the ruling was based “on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence.”72
Swanson and Kendricks consistently support the proposition that a
clearly erroneous view of the law is an abuse of discretion.73  However,
neither court addressed the issue of how an appellate court should review
subsidiary determinations of law for unsettled legal areas—where any view
of the law is unlikely to be clearly erroneous.74  The First Circuit addressed
exactly that scenario in Dalton.75
III. DALTON: THE FIRST CIRCUIT CREATES A CUSTOMIZED STANDARD OF
REVIEW FOR CDP APPEALS
The First Circuit in Dalton ruled on the issue of how to review subsidi-
ary determinations in CDP appeals.76  The reasonableness of the IRS’s fi-
nal collection determination turned on the subsidiary issue of whether the
taxpayer’s primary residence should be considered in the Daltons’ reason-
bankruptcy court. See id. at 78–79 (looking to other district court decisions for
guidance).
70. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
71. See Kendricks, 124 T.C. at 75 (citing Swanson and Hartmarx for idea that
erroneous views of law must be reversed under abuse of discretion review).  In
Hartmarx, the Court held that appellate courts should review a district court’s legal
determinations in a Rule 11 decision for abuse of discretion. See Hartmarx, 496
U.S. at 405 (“[A]n appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in
reviewing all aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 determination.” (emphasis ad-
ded)).  The Court relied on a prior decision that held a determination should pass
an abuse of discretion review if it “ ‘has a reasonable basis in law and fact.’” Id. at
403 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988)).  In holding that
a deferential standard was appropriate, the Court noted that the district court was
in a better position to carry out Rule 11’s policy goals. See id. at 404 (noting district
court’s familiarity with local bar to enforce rule’s goal to provide specific and gen-
eral deterrence).  The Court relied on Pierce to find that “deference was owed to
the ‘judicial actor . . . better positioned than another to decide the issue in ques-
tion.’” Id. at 403 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560).
72. Hartmarx, 496 U.S. at 405.
73. For a discussion of both Tax Court decisions, see supra notes 64–72 and
accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of how the Dalton court filled in this gap by deciding
which standard of review should apply for subsidiary determinations of uncertain
legal issues, see infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text.
75. For an analysis of the Dalton decision, see infra notes 110–26 and accom-
panying text.
76. For a complete discussion of the Dalton decision, see infra notes 79–106
and accompanying text.
13
Cole: A Preference For Deference: The Benefits of the First Circuit's C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR202.txt unknown Seq: 14  3-APR-13 11:06
252 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 239
able collection potential.77  In ruling for the IRS, the First Circuit created
a deferential, customized standard of review for CDP appeals.78
A. Telling the IRS That You Do Not Own Your Home to Escape a Tax
Liability: Background and Procedural History of Dalton
The Daltons were married taxpayers whose former business—like
many other businesses—owed the IRS payroll taxes withheld from their
employees’ paychecks, but never paid to the IRS.79  The Daltons were per-
sonally liable for $400,000 of unpaid tax from their business.80  The IRS
filed a notice of intent to levy, seeking the Daltons’ equity interest in their
primary residence (the “Property”).81  Before the Daltons’ tax trouble
started, legal title in the Property was transferred to a trust for little consid-
eration.82  The Daltons did not request a CDP hearing to dispute the
amount of tax owed, but to propose an offer-in-compromise (OIC) to set-
tle their debt for pennies on the dollar.83
At the hearing, the Daltons argued that they would never be able to
pay their full tax debt because they did not own the Property and had
insufficient income.84  The Daltons made an OIC to settle their $400,000
77. For a discussion of the facts and procedural background of the Dalton
case, see infra notes 79–93 and accompanying text.
78. For an analysis of the Dalton decision and a discussion of why the court
held for the IRS, see infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text.
79. See Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 152–53 (1st Cir. 2012) (describing
tax debt that arose from unpaid payroll taxes from taxpayer’s former business).
Unpaid payroll taxes represent a significant portion of the total unpaid, assessed
tax. See T. Keith Fogg, In Whom We Trust, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 357, 361 (2010)
(acknowledging small businesses account for higher portion of unpaid payroll
taxes than large businesses and how concentration is problematic because of high
failure rate for small businesses); Fogg, supra note 5, at 7–9 (giving example of how
companies usually “borrow” payroll taxes withheld for current cash needs instead
of paying to IRS).
80. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 153 (noting taxpayers were personally liable for
company’s tax debt under Code provision).
81. See id. (noting taxpayers had substantial equity interest in residence).
82. See id. at 152 (giving background of trust transaction).  In 1983, the
Daltons sold the Property to Mr. Dalton’s father for $1, who then transferred the
Property to a trust. See id.  The father was originally the trustee before his death,
when Mr. Dalton named his brother-in-law, Robert Pray, the successor trustee. See
id. at 152–53  The Daltons’ children were the primary beneficiaries of the trust;
however, the Daltons acted as the Property’s owners. See id. at 152 (noting Daltons
granted mortgage interest in Property and signed mortgage documents as owner).
Certain legal formalities associated with trusts were not observed, such as legal
paperwork being forwarded to the Daltons instead of the trustee. See id. at 153
(calling efforts to comply with legal formalities “less than scrupulous”).  In addi-
tion, the Daltons also used the Property as their primary residence and paid all of
its expenses. See id. at 152–53 (noting trustee Pray claimed to control trust
Property).
83. See id. (noting hearing requested under Section 6330(b)).
84. See id. at 153 (noting that “based on their assets and income, [the
Daltons] could never come close to satisfying their total tax liability”).  For a dis-
14
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debt for $10,000.85  The IRS calculated that the Daltons’ reasonable col-
lection potential was higher than the $10,000 OIC because it considered
the Property among the Daltons’ assets, and therefore rejected the offer.86
The IRS analyzed federal nominee law to conclude that the Daltons legally
owned the Property, not the trust.87  The Daltons appealed the determina-
tion to the Tax Court, which held that the IRS abused its discretion by not
considering state nominee law and remanded the case back to the IRS.88
On remand, the IRS analyzed Maine law and again concluded that the
Daltons owned legal title and therefore rejected the OIC a second time.89
Hearing the case again, the Tax Court reviewed the subsidiary owner-
ship issue de novo, but reviewed the IRS’s final decision to reject the OIC
for abuse of discretion.90 The Tax Court performed a lengthy analysis of
state and federal nominee law and held that the Daltons did not own the
Property.91  Therefore, the court held that the IRS abused its discretion by
rejecting the OIC.92  The IRS appealed the decision to the First Circuit.93
cussion of scenarios in which the IRS accepts OICs, including doubt as to col-
lectability, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 153 (noting Daltons asserted OIC should be ac-
cepted because of doubt as to collectability).  The offer represented less than 3%
of the total liability. See id. (stating that total liability was $400,000 and Daltons’
offer was $10,000).
86. See id. at 153–54 (commenting that taxpayer’s equity interest in Property
could be liquidated to provide more funds than current $10,000 offer).
87. See id. (noting IRS determined “trust . . . held naked legal title purely for
[the taxpayers’] convenience” and therefore trust was nominee for taxpayer).  A
nominee is “an ‘individual who holds legal title to property of a taxpayer while the
taxpayer enjoys full use and benefit of that property.’”  Stephanie Hoffer et al., To
Pay or Delay: The Nominee’s Dilemma Under Collection Due Process, 82 TUL. L. REV. 781,
807 (2008) (quoting IRM 5.17.2.5.7.2(1) (Mar. 27, 2012)) (explaining that nomi-
nee determination requires “facts and circumstances analysis[,]” with no one fac-
tor being determinative).  Among the factors listed in the Internal Revenue
Manual are whether the taxpayer retains possession or control of the property,
whether the nominee paid little or no consideration for the property, and whether
the taxpayer pays all or most of the property’s expenses. See id. (noting “federal
tax lien extends to property ‘actually’ owned by the taxpayer even though a third
party holds ‘legal’ title to the property as nominee” (quoting IRM 5.17.2.5.7.2(1)
(Mar. 27, 2012))).
88. See Dalton v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 3, 8 (2008) (reasoning court
could not conclude whether IRS abused discretion because it did not consider
nominee issue under state law); SALTZMAN, supra note 42, ¶ 14.15 (noting that state
law can decide whether nominee exists and listing factors courts consider).
89. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 154 (explaining IRS concluded Maine court would
look to federal law for nominee issue and therefore it followed its original legal
conclusion under federal law).
90. See id. (“Reviewing the IRS’s ownership finding de novo, the [Tax] court
determined that the trust was not a nominee of the taxpayers under Maine law.”).
91. See generally Dalton v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 393, 405–21 (2010) (discussing
federal and state nominee law), rev’d, 682 F.3d 149 (1st Cir. 2012).
92. See id. at 423 (concluding trust not taxpayer’s nominee under federal
law).
93. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 154 (“This timely second-tier appeal ensued.”).
The IRS issued a Chief Counsel Advisory disagreeing with the Tax Court’s decision
15
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B. The First Circuit: “One Size Does Not Fit All” 94 for CDP Standards
of Review
The court first noted that the proper standard of review for subsidiary
determinations the IRS makes during a CDP hearing was an issue of first
impression.95  To resolve the issue, the court created a two-step, custom-
ized standard of review for CDP: first, a reviewing court must determine
whether the IRS’s subsidiary determinations were reasonable using evi-
dence in the administrative record; second, it must determine whether the
final determination constituted an abuse of discretion.96
The court gave three reasons for its decision.97  First, the deferential
standard of review carried out the purpose of CDP: to ensure that IRS
collection decisions are not arbitrary.98  CDP was meant as an oversight of
IRS decisions, not as a means to adjudicate individual collection actions.99
The court stated that erroneous views of the facts or law would be unrea-
sonable and therefore always constitute an abuse of discretion.100  A de
novo review was inappropriate because it “would result in the courts ‘inevi-
tably becom[ing] involved on a daily basis with tax enforcement details
that judges are neither qualified, nor have the time, to administer.’”101
Second, the court found that the customized, deferential standard of re-
in Dalton and directed agents to look at the decision to see “how complex the
[nominee] question may become.”  I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory 201211023 (Mar.
16, 2012).
94. Dalton, 682 F.3d at 154 (“In the exercise of powers of judicial review, one
size does not fit all.”).
95. See id. at 151–52 (“[N]o court has had the occasion to parse that standard
and analyze how it plays out with respect to subsidiary factual and legal determina-
tions made by the IRS during the CDP process.  We grapple with that issue to-
day.”).  Although past courts “had the occasion” to analyze how the standard
applied to subsidiary determinations, the First Circuit was the first to explicitly rule
on the issue.  For a discussion of past Tax Court cases addressing this issue, see
supra notes 63–75 and accompanying text.
96. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 156 (summarizing new standard of review).  Both
components of the two-step, customized standard of review will hereinafter be re-
ferred to collectively as the “Dalton standard.”  The first part of the standard—
review of subsidiary determinations—when referred to alone will be called the
“reasonableness standard.”  The second part of the standard—review of the final
CDP determination—when referred to alone will be called the “abuse of discretion
standard.”
97. See id. at 154–56 (justifying decision that courts should use deferential
standard of review over subsidiary determinations).
98. See id. at 155 (explaining judicial review must be “tailored” to CDP’s pur-
pose of ensuring IRS decisions are not arbitrary).
99. See Book, supra note 16, at 1195–96 (arguing de novo review “tends to
become more of a judicial substitution of judgment, rather than a mechanism for
external control of agency practice—the very rationale for CDP in the first place”).
100. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 159 n.6 (“Of course, an absurd factual determina-
tion or a legal determination that flies in the face of settled precedent will never be
reasonable and, thus, will always constitute an abuse of the IRS’s discretion.”).
101. Id. at 155 (quoting Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 150 (1st Cir.
2005)).
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view made sense because of the informal nature of CDP hearings and the
likelihood the administrative record would be incomplete.102  Lastly, the
court noted that a de novo standard of review would create judicial ineffi-
ciencies by allowing the taxpayers “two bites at the cherry.”103
Once the court established the customized, deferential standard of
review, it ruled that the IRS did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the
Daltons’ OIC.104  The court found that the IRS took a reasonable view of
state and federal nominee law—a complex and unsettled area of law—to
determine the Daltons legally owned the property.105  The IRS therefore
did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the OIC because it reasonably
determined the Daltons had the ability to pay more than their offer.106
IV. UNDERSTANDING DALTON’S CUSTOMIZED STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
HOW IT BENEFITS THE TAX SYSTEM
The First Circuit’s customized standard of review for CDP benefits the
tax system for several reasons.107  The Dalton standard of review departs
from the Tax Court’s previous de novo review of subsidiary determina-
102. See id. at 155–56 (explaining that because Congress knew of possibility of
limited record to review, it never intended for courts to “undertake de novo review
of subsidiary determinations made during that process”).
103. See id. at 156 (noting if taxpayers lost, Commissioner would have to liti-
gate the ownership issue at proceeding with trust joined as party).  In this case, the
“cherry” was the issue of who owned the property. See id. (explaining that deciding
ownership issue would adjudicate rights of third party).
104. See id. at 158 (concluding IRS’s view of nominee law was reasonable—
because IRS reasonably concluded Daltons legally owned property and could af-
ford to pay more—and therefore IRS did not abuse discretion by rejecting
Daltons’ offer).
105. See id. at 157–59 (“In this instance, we believe that the IRS acted reasona-
bly in looking to case law from other jurisdictions to fill the void and illuminate
Maine’s nominee doctrine.”).  The court agreed with the IRS’s adoption of a bal-
ancing test that weighed several factors to analyze the nominee issue. See id. at 158
(“Viewed against this backdrop, the IRS’s decision to apply a balancing test to re-
solve the nominee question appears reasonable.”).  The court further agreed that
the IRS’s application of the test to conclude the Daltons legally owned the prop-
erty was reasonable. See id. (discussing various nominee factors and noting most
factors weighed against Daltons).  The court noted that the application of nomi-
nee law was not an easy decision. See id. at 159 (commenting that some factors
weighed in favor of Daltons, but true question was not who owned property, but
“whether the IRS’s determination, correct or not, falls within the wide universe of
reasonable outcomes”).  For a further discussion of nominee law and the relevant
factors, see supra note 87.
106. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 158 (implying that IRS included Property in
Daltons’ RCP, and therefore Daltons’ $10,000 offer fell well below their RCP).  For
a discussion on what information the IRS uses to calculate a taxpayer’s RCP, see
supra note 44.
107. For a discussion of how a deferential review of subsidiary determinations
made during a CDP hearing benefits the tax system, see infra notes 127–76 and
accompanying text.
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tions, which essentially gave taxpayers a new trial.108  The First Circuit’s
more deferential standard of review benefits the tax system because it (1)
increases efficiency for both the government and courts; (2) promotes
fairness for taxpayers; and (3) is consistent with the purpose of CDP.109
A. Saying “No” to De Novo: How the Dalton Standard Differs From the Tax
Court’s Approach
The Dalton decision provided new guidance for the Tax Court be-
cause it explicitly analyzed the proper standard of review in CDP appeals
when the IRS decides subsidiary questions of law and fact.110  Specifically,
Dalton dealt with a subsidiary question involving an unsettled area of
law.111  The First Circuit and the Tax Court previously agreed that errone-
ous views of the law constituted a per se abuse of discretion.112  This prin-
ciple found support in Dalton.113 Dalton, however, provided further
guidance by holding that a reasonable view of the law should be affirmed
under its customized reasonableness standard, not analyzed de novo.114
The decision in Dalton departs from the Tax Court’s unarticulated de
novo standard used in prior cases because it held that a subsidiary legal
issue is reviewed for reasonableness.115  It also implicitly conflicts with the
Tax Court’s assertion that the standard of review for subsidiary legal ques-
108. For a discussion of how the First Circuit’s decision departed from the
Tax Court’s previous approach for subsidiary determinations in CDP hearings, see
infra notes 110–26 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the efficiencies promoted by the Dalton standard, see
infra notes 131–52 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of how the standard
increases fairness in the tax system, see infra notes 153–62 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of how the standard reinforces CDP’s purpose, see infra notes
163–76 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of how Dalton presented an issue of first impression for
the First Circuit, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
111. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 159 (“Whether an IRS determination reached dur-
ing the CDP process rests upon a purely factual question, a purely legal question,
or a mixed question of fact and law, a reviewing court’s mission is the same: to
evaluate the reasonableness of the IRS’s subsidiary determination.”).  The court
implies that the nominee issue was an unsettled issue of law, and therefore it was
unlikely that any view of the law could be erroneous. See id. at 157 (noting IRS
acted reasonably to look at other jurisdictions for law to fill “void” in Maine law).
112. See, e.g., R&G Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 584 F.3d 1,
7–8 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting under abuse of discretion review “material error of law
constitutes a per se abuse of discretion”); Swanson v. Comm’r, 121 T.C. 111, 119
(2003) (holding erroneous views of law cannot stand under abuse of discretion
review).
113. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 159 n.6 (acknowledging erroneous views of law
would be unreasonable and therefore constitute abuse of discretion).
114. See id. at 156 (“[A] court’s job is not to review the IRS’s CDP determina-
tions afresh.”).
115. See, e.g., Swanson, 121 T.C. at 125 (reviewing subsidiary bankruptcy law
issue “afresh” by giving no deference to IRS conclusions, but failing to state exact
standard of review).  For a discussion of the Dalton reasonableness standard of re-
view for subsidiary determinations, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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tions “makes no difference.”116  Undeniably, if the IRS took an erroneous
view of the law, it should be reversed under either standard of review.117
Conversely, if the IRS took a reasonable view of the law—albeit a view with
which the Tax Court disagreed—it would be upheld under the Dalton rea-
sonableness standard, but reversed in a de novo review.118
Dalton is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s general guidance
in Hartmarx because the Dalton standard of review also gives the original
reviewing body, the IRS, proper deference.119  The IRS is in a better posi-
tion to make collection decisions and carry out policy goals than the Tax
Court.120  Just as in Hartmarx, Dalton allows for the opportunity for an ap-
pellate court to overturn “absurd” legal or factual conclusions under an
abuse of discretion standard.121
The Dalton court avoided turning an abuse of discretion review of the
final determination into a de novo trial.122  A de novo review of subsidiary
determinations, paired with an abuse of discretion review of the final de-
termination, would convert the analysis into a de novo trial because the
court’s review would give no deference to the IRS’s judgment.123  Effec-
116. Kendricks v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 69, 75 (2005) (“Whether characterized as
a review for abuse of discretion or as a consideration ‘de novo’ (of a question of
law), we must reject erroneous views of the law.”).
117. See, e.g., Dalton, 682 F.3d at 159 n.6 (discussing in dicta that absurd views
of law would always be unreasonable and constitute abuse of discretion); Kendricks,
124 T.C. at 75 (rejecting erroneous views of law under either de novo or abuse of
discretion standard).
118. Compare Dalton, 682 F.3d at 159 (“[T]he IRS acts within its discretion as
long as it makes a reasonable prediction of what the facts and/or the law will even-
tually show.”), with infra note 123 (discussing courts taking independent view and
substituting their judgment in place of IRS under de novo review).
119. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (deciding
proper standard of review for Rule 11 determinations).  In Hartmarx, the Supreme
Court noted that the district court was in a better position to make decisions on
Rule 11 than an appellate court, and therefore it should be afforded more defer-
ence, even on legal issues. See id. (noting deference would conserve court re-
sources).  Similarly, Dalton recognized that the IRS, not courts, should be making
collection decisions, and therefore the IRS should be afforded more deference.
See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 155 (finding stricter standard of review would result in
courts, not IRS, enforcing collection actions that “ ‘judges are neither qualified,
nor have the time, to administer’” (quoting Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144,
150 (1st Cir. 2005))).
120. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 467 (arguing that courts
should give deference because it is IRS’s responsibility to make collection
decisions).
121. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 159 n.6 (stating “absurd” legal or factual determi-
nation would be unreasonable and therefore is de facto abuse of discretion).
122. For a discussion of how the Dalton decision avoided de novo trials by
providing a deferential standard of review, see infra notes 123–26 and accompany-
ing text.
123. See Book, supra note 16, at 1194–97 (arguing that when Tax Court substi-
tutes its judgment for IRS in abuse of discretion review, it resembles de novo re-
view).  A de novo review of subsidiary determinations and Robinette’s de novo scope
of review that allows new evidence both allow courts to substitute their judgment
for that of the IRS. See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text (discussing Robi-
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tively, the de novo review of subsidiary determinations would swallow the
abuse of discretion standard because it would allow courts to substitute
their judgment for the IRS’s.124  In Dalton, the entire question of whether
the IRS abused its discretion in rejecting the Daltons’ OIC turned on the
subsidiary issue of whether the Property should be included in the
Daltons’ reasonable collection potential.125  Therefore, the de novo re-
view of the subsidiary ownership issue would effectively usurp an abuse of
discretion review of the final decision of rejecting the OIC.126
B. A Preference for Deference: The Benefits of Dalton’s Customized Standard
of Review
The Dalton standard benefits the tax system for three reasons.127
First, it increases both collection efficiency and judicial efficiency because
it reduces delay in collection and allows the IRS to be the primary deci-
sion-maker.128  Second, it promotes fairness in collection by discouraging
noncompliance.129  Third, it is consistent with the purpose of CDP be-
cause deferential review is sufficient to ensure the IRS’s collection actions
are reasonable.130
1. Efficiency: Let the IRS, Not Courts, Handle Day-To-Day Tax Collection
The Dalton standard of review benefits the tax system because it pro-
motes two types of efficiency: collection efficiency and judicial effi-
nette’s de novo scope of review).  Therefore, the collection system reaps the same
benefits from rejecting a de novo review in both contexts. See infra notes 127–76
and accompanying text (discussing benefits of deferential review of IRS decisions).
124. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 459–60 (explaining Tax
Court’s approach in abuse of discretion “closely resembles a trial de novo,” which
“encourages the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Service”); Danshera
Cords, Collection Due Process: The Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1021, 1041 (2005) [hereinafter Cords, Scope and Nature of Judicial Review]
(“[C]ourt[s] should seldom, if ever, substitute [their] judgment for that of the
Service.  The Service has vast experience dealing with tax collections.”).
125. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 159 (commenting that IRS does not abuse its dis-
cretion if it reasonably determines taxpayer can pay more than offer amount).  If
the valuable Property is included in the amount the Daltons could reasonably pay,
the Daltons $10,000 offer is much lower than what they could pay. See id. (noting
IRS acted within its discretion by rejecting Daltons’ offer).
126. For a discussion of how de novo review of evidence, paired with abuse of
discretion review of final decisions, allows courts to substitute their judgment for
the IRS’s, see supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
127. For a discussion of the reasons the Dalton standard benefits the tax sys-
tem, see infra notes 131–76 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of how the Dalton standard promotes efficiency, see infra
notes 131–52 and accompanying text.
129. For a discussion of how the Dalton standard encourages fairness in tax
collection, see infra notes 153–62 and accompanying text.
130. For a discussion of why the Dalton standard is consistent with the purpose
of CDP, see infra notes 163–76 and accompanying text.
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ciency.131  First, the standard increases efficiency in tax collection for both
the government and taxpayers because it reduces delay.132  Second, the
standard increases efficiency for courts by entrusting the day-to-day collec-
tion responsibilities to the IRS.133
a. Collection Efficiency: How Dalton’s Deferential Standard Reduces
Collection Costs
A de novo review of subsidiary determinations would result in delayed
collection, costing both taxpayers and the government.134  A de novo re-
view of subsidiary factual and legal decisions delays collection because it
could result in more litigation.135  For example, in Dalton, if the court per-
formed a de novo review of the ownership issue and found that the tax-
payer owned the property, the IRS would need to re-litigate the issue in
another proceeding with the trust.136  Giving taxpayers such as the
Daltons a second “bite at the cherry” through de novo review further de-
lays collection because of the lengthy nature of adjudicating issues in
court.137  CDP cases already represent one of the most litigated issues in
tax court, and judicial review that potentially creates more litigation only
further burdens the IRS.138
Collection that is further delayed through additional layers of judicial
review also costs the government money because of the decreased likeli-
131. For a discussion of how the Dalton standard enhances efficiency in the
tax collection system, see infra notes 134–52 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of how the Dalton standard of review reduces delay and
increases efficiency for taxpayers and the government, see infra notes 134–44 and
accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of how the Dalton standard of review increases judicial
efficiency, see infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of how de novo review of subsidiary determinations de-
lays collection and how that costs taxpayers and the government, see infra notes
135–44 and accompanying text.
135. See Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that
de novo review would give Daltons multiple opportunities to contest ownership
issue).
136. See id. (“Such a duplication of effort would both undermine the signifi-
cant public interest in the speedy and efficient resolution of disputes and open the
door to inconsistent decisions.”).
137. Id. See also I.R.C. § 6330(e)(1) (2006) (suspending collection during
CDP hearing and ensuing appeals pending).  Resolving CDP cases in court can
take up to “300–400 days or more.”  Bryan T. Camp, The Costs of CDP, 105 TAX
NOTES 1445, 1446 (2004) (analyzing sample of Tax Court cases to determine
length of time between CDP notice and final court decision).  In Dalton, the IRS
first issued a CDP notice in 2004; the final court decision was filed in 2012. See
Dalton, 682 F.3d at 153 (detailing history of case and notice of intent to levy sent in
2004).  The original tax liability was from 1996. See id. (explaining that tax liability
increased with accrued interest).
138. See 2011 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 619 (“Since 2003,
CDP has been one of the federal tax issues most frequently litigated in the federal
courts . . . .”); FY 2013 BUDGET, supra note 14, at 9 (requesting over $4.8 billion for
enforcement activities).
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hood of collection the longer the process is prolonged.139  A de novo re-
view of subsidiary determinations could add years in litigation before a
final court decision.140  Those years of litigation increase the chance that,
even if the IRS eventually proves its collection action was reasonable, it
could collect nothing.141
Delay also hurts the delinquent taxpayer because of accumulated in-
terest and penalties that must be paid if the IRS eventually wins.142  In
some cases, the accumulated interest can exceed the original tax liabil-
ity.143  A de novo standard of review that encourages more litigation and
delay could lead to taxpayers unnecessarily owing more money to the
government.144
b. Judicial Efficiency: Easing the Burden on the Tax Court’s Already
Heavy Docket
A deferential review of subsidiary determinations promotes efficiency
because it allows for minimal court interference in tax collection.145  A de
novo review of IRS subsidiary determinations would place an even higher
hurdle on collecting taxes, risking courts becoming “involved on a daily
basis with tax enforcement details that judges are neither qualified, nor
have the time, to administer.”146  CDP cases already clog the Tax Court’s
139. See Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative
State, 84 IND. L.J. 57, 105 (2009) [hereinafter Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process]
(commenting that “after three years, collections on each unpaid dollar reaches
zero.”).
140. For a discussion of how de novo review adds time to CDP cases, see supra
note 137 and accompanying text.
141. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2004 AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 233 (2004) (Volume 1), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-utl/ntafy2004annualreport.pdf (showing diminishing collections with
passage of time).
142. See Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 139, at 105 (“For every
day that taxpayers delay collection, they owe additional interest and possible penal-
ties on their taxes.”); see also Dalton, 682 F.3d at 153 (noting interest accumulation
on original tax liability).
143. See Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 139, at 105 (comment-
ing that National Taxpayer Advocate has noted “accumulation of interest and pen-
alties on those taxpayer accounts not resolved during the Notice stage will often
equal or exceed the original delinquencies”).
144. See id. (describing that extended CDP process leads most taxpayers “fur-
ther and further into debt”).
145. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 464 (“Significant limits on
judicial interference with tax collection are necessary to prevent the tax collection
system from screeching to a halt.”).
146. Living Care Alts. of Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 631 (6th
Cir. 2005).  A de novo review of subsidiary determinations would create the same
judicial inefficiencies as the Robinette de novo scope of review that allows the court
to consider new evidence during appellate review because both standards require
courts to substitute their judgment for the IRS and become the primary collection
decision-maker. See Lane, supra note 16, at 160 (noting de novo scope of review on
appeal would “require an enormous amount of time”).  Lane argues that “the Tax
Court simply does not have the time, resources, or energy to admit new evidence
22
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docket.147  A more burdensome review is inefficient because it diverts lim-
ited court resources away from other cases.148
In addition to the increased burden on scarce judicial resources, a de
novo standard of review would shift tax collection decisions away from the
experts, the IRS, and to the judiciary.149  A de novo review of subsidiary
determinations would require the courts to substitute their judgment for
the IRS’s.150  The IRS is best suited to make decisions about the most effi-
cient and effective way to collect taxes because it has resources and exper-
tise that the judiciary does not, such as the ability to analyze and verify a
taxpayer’s information.151  Accordingly, judicial review should give defer-
ence to the IRS’s judgments and expertise.152
2. Fairness: Applying the Principle of Horizontal Equity to CDP’s Standard of
Review
Dalton’s deferential standard of review of subsidiary determinations
promotes horizontal equity in tax collection because it discourages tax eva-
sion.153  A tax system with horizontal equity requires that similarly situated
of the kind admitted in Robinette.” Id. See also Cords, Administrative Law, supra note
10, at 464 (“Significant limits on judicial interference with tax collection are neces-
sary to prevent the tax collection system from screeching to a halt.”).  Likewise, a
de novo review of subsidiary legal and factual conclusions would consume the
same, if not greater, judicial resources. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 156 (noting de novo
scope would create inefficiency because “[s]uch a duplication of effort would both
undermine the significant public interest in the speedy and efficient resolution of
disputes and open the door to inconsistent decisions”).
147. See 2011 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 619 (discussing
CDP appeal as one of most litigated issues in Tax Court since 2003).
148. See Lane, supra note 16, at 160 (arguing de novo scope of review “may
slow the court’s ability to efficiently manage an already voluminous caseload”).
149. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 467 (noting that IRS is
“charged with collecting taxes and making decisions about the most appropriate
way to collect taxes[,]” which does not “require the substitution of the court’s judg-
ment for the Service’s judgment”); see also Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 459
(8th Cir. 2006) (“We see merit in the observation of these courts that Congress
likely contemplated review for “‘a clear abuse of discretion in the sense of clear
taxpayer abuse and unfairness by the IRS,’” lest the judiciary become involved on a
daily basis with tax enforcement details that Congress intended to leave with the
IRS.” (quoting Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 150 (1st Cir. 2005)).
150. See Lane, supra note 16, at 160–61 (arguing responsibility to make deter-
minations in CDP cases rests with IRS, not Tax Court).
151. See Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 139, at 97 (“[T]o allow
taxpayers to introduce new evidence at the judicial review stage would make courts
assume the agency’s role and work the cases. . . .  Not only do courts lack the
expertise of the agency employees to make a fair evaluation of the information,
they also lack the resources to verify the information presented.”).
152. See Cords, Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, supra note 124, at 1041 (ar-
guing courts should rarely overturn IRS’s collection judgments because IRS has
more experience dealing with tax collection).
153. For a discussion of how the Dalton standard promotes fairness by discour-
aging tax evasion, see infra notes 154–62 and accompanying text.
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taxpayers be treated the same.154  Allowing de novo review of subsidiary
determinations could lead to similarly situated taxpayers having different
tax burdens, depending on whether a taxpayer has “the time, energy, and
persistence to fight the Service into submission.”155  Delinquent taxpayers
are given favorable treatment with de novo review because of their ability
to further delay reasonable collection actions, while compliant taxpayers
pay their taxes on time and in full.156  A delinquent taxpayer that can
extend court review through a de novo examination of subsidiary determi-
nations can delay paying a tax liability, leaving compliant taxpayers to foot
the bill.157
A de novo standard of review for subsidiary determinations could also
encourage taxpayers to practice tax evasion, further slowing collection and
creating inequity in the tax system.158  Allowing courts to second-guess the
IRS through de novo review of subsidiary determinations could lead to the
154. For a discussion of the concept of horizontal equity, see supra note 11.
155. Lane, supra note 16, at 171.  Lane argues that an expanded scope of
review would lead to more taxpayers trying to evade taxes, but the same logic ap-
plies to an expanded review of subsidiary determinations because both situations
allow the Tax Court to substitute its judgment for the IRS. See id. (“[T]he system
will operate rewarding those who are less-honest and willing to fight, while punish-
ing those who are more-honest or less inclined to fight.”).  Lane notes that compli-
ant taxpayers are hurt by delinquent taxpayers in two ways: first, they pay their fair
share while delinquent taxpayers do not; second, as a result of increasing delin-
quency, taxes are likely to increase because of the inability to collect revenues. See
id. at 171–72 (arguing de novo scope of review would also “significantly drive-up
overall costs of collecting taxes by increasing the Service’s time spent litigating
cases”).
156. See Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 139, at 110 (arguing
against CDP partly because of a “won’t pay” taxpayer’s ability to delay collection “at
the expense of compliant taxpayers”).
157. See Lane, supra note 16, at 171 (describing unfairness to honest taxpayers
who “not only pay their current fair-share, but face increasing tax hikes as a result
of tax increases because of the system’s inability to collect sufficient revenues”); see
also 2006 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 6 (describing “extraordi-
nary burden” delinquent taxpayers place on compliant taxpayers because of non-
payment of validly owed taxes).
158. See Lane, supra note 16, at 171 (discussing possible “chilling effect of
scrutiny” and possibility it could “increase the number of individuals who practice
tax evasion, and may further embolden them to continue evading after realizing
the Service is less likely to pursue them”).  One commentator estimates frivolous
claims already represented at least one-third of CDP cases. See Camp, Failure of
Adversarial Process, supra note 139, at 116 (examining select CDP appeals and not-
ing early on CDP was “a ‘boon to tax protestors and a pain to everyone else’”
(quoting Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 122
(2004))).  Professor Camp noted that frivolous claims decreased with more court-
imposed sanctions. See id. (noting direct correlation between lower frivolous
claims and increased sanctions); see also Nick A. Zotos, Service Collection Abuse of
Discretion: What Is the Appropriate Standard of Review and Scope of the Record in Collection
Due Process Appeals?, 62 TAX LAW. 223, 237 (2008) (noting IRS can assess $5,000
penalty for frivolous arguments and Tax Court can assess $25,000 penalty).  Zotos
notes that “the Tax Court has demonstrated an increased willingness to impose
sanctions as a means of dealing with frivolous claims.” Id.
24
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IRS settling more cases before court review.159  In turn, taxpayers would
then be encouraged to avoid paying taxes, fight the IRS through CDP, and
hope to secure a lower tax liability through an OIC.160  Taxpayers might
sense unfairness in a system that allows some to avoid liabilities through
CDP, and those individuals are then less likely to comply with tax laws in
the future.161  Ultimately, if courts allowed a de novo review of subsidiary
determinations, compliant taxpayers would lose while delinquent taxpay-
ers would win—the definition of unfairness.162
3. Sticking to the Point: De Novo Review of Subsidiary Determinations Is
Inconsistent with the Purpose of CDP
Judicial review is a critical part of the CDP regime because CDP is
intended to ensure the IRS’s collection actions are reasonable through
third party oversight.163  To be consistent with CDP’s purpose, courts only
need to decide whether the IRS’s collection action is reasonable, not nec-
159. See Lane, supra note 16, at 171 (arguing judicial substitution of judgment
will result in more settlements because IRS “will become more afraid of close
scrutiny”).
160. See id. (commenting that IRS “will likely try to settle more CDP cases
through OIC’s that are substantially inadequate to the tax liability actually owed” if
judges can substitute judgment in place of IRS).  This hypothesis is not theoretical:
if the Tax Court had its way with de novo review of subsidiary determinations, this
would have been the exact result in the Dalton case. See Dalton v. Comm’r, 682
F.3d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting taxpayers offered to settle tax debt for just
$10,000 of $400,000).
161. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 1020–21 (showing decreases in IRS en-
forcement activity leads to decrease in compliance rate and arguing for increased
IRS budget); Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating?  A Response to Eric Posner’s
Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 378–80 (2002) (discussing how
awareness of others cheating on taxes affects compliance rates).  Professor Kahan
details a study by the Minnesota Department of Revenue in which letters were sent
to taxpayers telling them that compliance rates were higher than public percep-
tion. See id. at 380 (using study as example to show taxpayer trust in system corre-
lates to higher compliance rate).  Taxpayers who received the letter “reported
more income and claimed fewer deductions than did individuals in a control
group.” Id. (“[S]imply advising taxpayers that others were inclined to comply was
more cost-effective than the threat of an audit!”).  It follows that a public percep-
tion of decreased compliance and low trust in the system would result in a higher
rate of non-compliance among taxpayers. See id.
162. For a discussion of how de novo review of subsidiary determinations ben-
efits delinquent taxpayers while harming compliant taxpayers, see supra notes
153–61 and accompanying text.
163. See Book, supra note 16, at 1195–96 (arguing introduction of new evi-
dence during CDP appeal allows “judicial substitution of judgment, rather than a
mechanism for external control of agency practice—the very rationale for CDP in
the first place”); see also Leslie Book, A Response To Professor Camp: The Importance of
Oversight, 84 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 63, 73 (2009) (defending judicial review in CDP
as “important safety valve” because “CDP’s limited review has served its intended
oversight function of limited aspects of the collection process, and correct for egre-
gious agency error”).
25
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essarily whether it is “correct.”164  Abuse of discretion review is intended to
ensure results are not arbitrary, while de novo review is intended to reach
the correct result.165  A de novo review of subsidiary determinations would
be inconsistent with the purpose of CDP because it would require courts
to make individual determinations of correctness, while overturning po-
tentially reasonable IRS collection actions.166  After thoughtful considera-
tion, Congress rejected a version of CDP that allowed courts to perform a
full de novo review of individual IRS collection actions.167  The Dalton
164. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 156 (explaining appellate court’s purpose is to
ensure “factual and legal conclusions reached at a CDP hearing are reasonable”).
The Dalton court noted that the “CDP process presents no occasion for a reviewing
court to demand incontrovertibly correct answers to subsidiary questions, whatever
their nature.” Id. at 159.  The Tax Court traditionally functions as a trial court, not
as an appellate court. See Book, supra note 16, at 1195–96 (explaining Tax Court’s
history as court of original jurisdiction and holding de novo trials in context of
deficiencies cases to determine taxpayer’s true liability).  Because the Tax Court is
accustomed to reviewing matters de novo in order to find the correct answer, it is
not as familiar with true abuse of discretion review. See id. at 1196 (explaining Tax
Court’s de novo record rule approach as “fail[ing] to appreciate that review of
collection determinations is intended as a means to provide oversight to IRS activi-
ties and is not about identifying agency error on an individualized basis”); see also
Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 463 (observing that “district courts have
more experience conducting abuse of discretion review than does the Tax
Court”).  The Tax Court’s de novo approach in CDP review where abuse of discre-
tion is appropriate fails to consider that different standards of review apply in dif-
ferent circumstances. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 463
(explaining Tax Court has justified its de novo approach in CDP cases by pointing
to its approach in deficiency cases); Lane, supra note 16, at 168 (“While the motiva-
tion to ‘get the right answer’ may be noble . . . it likely is not what Congress in-
tended for the Tax Court in reviewing CDP cases.”).
165. See Woodral v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999) (describing abuse of dis-
cretion standard); Book, supra note 16, at 1196 (describing de novo review in CDP
context as one in which “court is concerned with the right answer, regardless of
the agency action preceding the court review”); Lane, supra note 16, at 168 (stating
“purpose of a de novo review is to get to the right answer[,]” but that “it likely is
not what Congress intended for the Tax Court in reviewing CDP cases.”); Richard
H. W. Maloy, “Standards of Review”—Just a Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
603, 609 (2000) (noting that de novo review is “intended to produce the correct
substantive result”).
166. See Book, supra note 16, at 1195 (arguing that limiting IRS’s ability to
offer post-hearing justification for actions in de novo review would create incen-
tives for IRS to act reasonably during administrative hearing). But see Eliza Mae
Scheibel, Note, Mixing It Up: The Tax Court Pairs a De Novo Scope of Review with an
Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review Under Section 6330(D) in Robinette v. Commis-
sioner, 58 TAX LAW. 941, 953–54 (2005) (arguing de novo scope of review carries
out purpose of CDP to protect taxpayers because limited scope of review would not
be sufficient to curb abuse).  For the argument that abuse of discretion review of
subsidiary determinations is sufficient to protect taxpayers from IRS error, see infra
notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
167. See Camp, Collection Context, supra note 38, at 975–76 (describing earlier
version of CDP passed by Senate as having provisions that would make collection
“full-blown shift to adversarial process and would have severely restricted IRS col-
lection activity”).  The provisions allowed taxpayers to obtain court review of “each
and every collection decision made by the IRS in their individual case,” as well as
“contest the merits of an assessment in all CDP hearings.” Id. at 975 (arguing these
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss2/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR202.txt unknown Seq: 27  3-APR-13 11:06
2013] NOTE 265
court properly recognized that the deferential reasonableness review of
subsidiary determinations carries out CDP’s purpose.168
While the Dalton standard will likely result in more courts affirming
the IRS’s judgments, lopsided results would not mean the standard of re-
view is ineffective.169  Although it seems counterintuitive, it would be ben-
eficial to taxpayers as a whole if the IRS frequently prevailed on appeal
because it would mean the IRS’s proposed collection action was reasona-
ble—the entire purpose of CDP.170  There is also concern that a deferen-
tial review of subsidiary determinations could provide an incentive for the
IRS to develop an insufficient record to increase the chances a reviewing
court will affirm its determination.171  However, this concern is addressed
by the Tax Court’s policy to remand cases where the administrative record
is insufficient to review the IRS’s determination.172
provisions would undermine automatic nature of bulk collection and effectively
abolish long-standing rule that taxpayers pay liability in full before contesting it).
These provisions were even too extreme for the Clinton administration. See id.
(describing argument against provisions was that they would effectively give taxpay-
ers “multiple bites at the apple[,]” with apple being opportunity to contest tax
liability).  The Dalton court also expressed this concern about de novo review of
subsidiary determinations, using a cherry metaphor instead of an apple. See Dalton,
682 F.3d at 156 (“De novo review would also give the taxpayers two bites at the
cherry.”).
168. See Dalton, 682 F.3d at 155 (“We conclude, therefore, that judicial review
must be tailored to effecting the purpose of the CDP process; that is, to ensuring
that the IRS’s determinations, whether of fact or of law, are not arbitrary.”); see also
Murphy v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2006) (declining to find abuse of
discretion in order to avoid “transform[ing] CDP hearings from a shield against
invasive government conduct into a taxpayer’s tool to delay the timely collection of
delinquent tax liabilities by seeking endless extensions”); Olsen v. United States,
414 F.3d 144, 151 (1st Cir. 2005) (“While Congress clearly wanted to prevent mere
bureaucratic harassment, we do not understand it to have intended to strip the IRS
of effective and reasonable tax collection procedures.”).
169. See Zotos, supra note 158, at 228–29 (explaining high rate of success for
IRS when its determinations are appealed); 2011 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT,
supra note 14, at 624 (showing IRS success rate from 2003 through 2011, with
lowest success rate for any year at 89% and highest success rate at 96%).  For a
discussion of why lopsided results would not necessarily show that the system is
ineffective, see infra note 170 and accompanying text.
170. See Book, supra note 16, at 1203 (suggesting “success of [CDP] should
not be based on the number of reversals . . . but rather on the broader effects that
[CDP] would create, thereby improving IRS collection procedures”); Zotos, supra
note 158, at 236 (examining reasons IRS wins majority of appeals and explaining
one reason is IRS has “cleaned up its act so to speak, and the CDP provisions have
been successful in preventing the very institutional abuses the statute was intended
to prevent”).
171. See, e.g., Dalton v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 393, 423 n.30 (2010) (acknowledg-
ing taxpayer’s argument that IRS purposely failed to create sufficient administra-
tive record but ruling for taxpayer on other grounds), rev’d, 682 F.3d 149 (1st Cir.
2012).
172. See Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 126 (2004) (“In the event the
administrative record of such an informal proceeding is insufficiently developed,
‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation.’” (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lo-
27
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Supporters of de novo review could argue the deferential Dalton stan-
dard does not sufficiently ensure that the IRS’s collection actions are rea-
sonable.173  Put another way, the Dalton standard of review is only
appropriate if the risk of IRS error is low and no other relief is available
for the taxpayer.174  However, the Dalton standard properly protects tax-
payers from IRS abuse because it catches egregious agency errors while
allowing the IRS to carry out its collection function without unnecessary
intrusion.175  Further, as the Dalton court noted, there are usually alterna-
tive avenues of relief available to taxpayers when a CDP hearing is
inadequate.176
V. CONCLUSION
At the end of fiscal year 2011, the IRS Office of Appeals had over
32,000 CDP cases pending before it.177  The question of the proper stan-
rion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985))); Lane, supra note 16, at 162 (detailing “well-estab-
lished” rule that remand back to IRS is appropriate if record is insufficiently
developed). But see Carlton M. Smith, The Tax Court Keeps Growing Its Collection Due
Process Powers, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 17, 2011, at 222–11 (questioning whether
Tax Court has power to remand CDP cases and arguing Tax Court has inherent
power to order IRS to accept OIC).
173. See Zotos, supra note 158, at 237–38 (questioning whether abuse of dis-
cretion is proper standard of review in CDP cases).
174. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 172 (“A robust Tax Court review proceeding is
necessary to effectuate what I believe was Congress’s intent in setting up the CDP
in the first place—preventing the IRS from overreaching in the collection
process.”).
175. See Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 468–69 (arguing “de novo
review is not necessary to protect taxpayers” in collection decisions); Zotos, supra
note 158, at 237–38 (arguing that abuse of discretion standard protects against
“overreaching Service practices while at the same time providing [IRS] agents with
the discretion necessary to carry out their day-to-day functions, which is precisely
the result the statute was intended to produce”).  Professor Cords argues that de
novo review would shift some tax collection decisions to the Tax Court, “which
does not have the experience or expertise to efficiently make these decisions.” See
Cords, Administrative Law, supra note 10, at 468 (arguing shift of decision making
power to Tax Court would “hamper the functioning of the tax collection system”);
see also Book, supra note 16, at 1203 (arguing “even highly deferential judicial re-
view of agency action provides incentives for better agency practice, increases pub-
lic confidence in agency practice, and is an integral part of our system of checks
and balances . . . .”).
176. See Dalton v. Comm’r, 682 F.3d 149, 156 n.4 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting “def-
erential standard of review by no means leaves a taxpayer at the mercy of the IRS”).
The Dalton court notes that the Daltons could seek a court order to remove the
attachment of the Property, or the trust itself could attempt to remove the attach-
ment through either wrongful levy or quiet title actions. See id. (“There are almost
always other legal channels through which a taxpayer may develop a complete re-
cord and secure a definitive legal ruling on a contested point of law or fact.”).
177. See SOI Tax Stats—Appeals Workload, By Type of Case, I.R.S., http://www.irs.
gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats—Appeals-Workload,-by-Type-of-Case,-IRS-Data-Book-Ta-
ble-21 (last updated Aug. 3, 2012) (providing IRS statistics for Appeals Office wor-
kload by year).  The source of potential CDP cases is also massive: only
approximately 1.2% of taxpayers that receive a CDP notice request a hearing. See
28
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dard of review of subsidiary determinations made during a CDP hearing is
likely to arise again because a significant number of CDP cases are ap-
pealed to the Tax Court.178  The Tax Court is unlikely to apply Dalton’s
customized standard of review in future cases that are not appealable to
the First Circuit because of the Golsen rule.179  Therefore, Congress should
amend the CDP statutes to codify Dalton’s customized standard of re-
view.180  If Congress does not amend CDP, other circuits should adopt the
Dalton standard because of its benefits in providing tax efficiency, tax fair-
ness, and consistency with the purpose of CDP.181  In the current period
of rising budget deficits, courts should not make it more difficult for the
IRS to collect taxes when it uses reasonable methods.182
Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 139, at 99 (suggesting high non-
response rate could mean either IRS properly classified taxpayers, or taxpayers
agree they are “won’t pays”).  In fiscal year 2004, over 2 million CDP notices were
sent, resulting in 28,133 hearings requested. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NA-
TIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 459 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/section_2.pdf (noting large number of
unrequested hearings).
178. See 2011 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE REPORT, supra note 14, at 619 (identifying
CDP appeals as one of most litigated issues in Tax Court since its inception).
179. See, e.g., Klingenberg v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 398, 401 (2011)
(describing Tax Court’s willingness to follow Robinette’s de novo scope of review
rule, despite being previously overturned by another circuit court, because of ad-
herence to Golsen rule).  Under the Golsen rule, the Tax Court will only be bound
by the Dalton decision in cases appealable to the First Circuit and is free to apply its
de novo review of subsidiary determinations in the other circuits. See Golsen v.
Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970) (holding Tax Court follows law of circuit to
which case is appealable).  For a further discussion of the Golsen rule, see supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
180. See Cords, Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, supra note 124, at 1057
(“Congressional clarification of the CDP provisions relating to judicial review is
essential. . . .  [T]he CDP provisions need to make clear exactly what standards the
courts are to apply to CDP appeals, and in which contexts.”).
181. For a discussion of the benefits the Dalton standard provides, see supra
notes 127–76 and accompanying text.
182. For a discussion of the rising budget deficit and how increased tax collec-
tion decreases the deficit, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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